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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal requires us to address whether rent-to-own 
agreements which are terminable at any time without additional 
charges fall under the purview of the Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.  The district court, relying 
primarily on a Federal Reserve Board regulation, concluded that 
they do not.  The court therefore granted the lessor's motion to 
dismiss the federal count of the complaint, declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over the supplemental state claims, and remanded the 
case to the Superior Court of New Jersey.  Because we agree with 
the district court, we will affirm its judgment. 
 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
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 Appellant Naomi Ortiz, the named plaintiff in this putative 
class action, entered into a rental agreement to lease a sofa and 
a love seat from appellee Rental Management, Inc. (RMI) in 
November 1992.  The rental agreement specified that Ortiz at her 
option could make rental payments on any one of four schedules: 
— weekly payments of $28.49; 
— biweekly payments of $56.98; 
— semi-monthly payments of 61.72; or 
— monthly payments of $108.63. 
 
The agreement also required her to pay an initial charge of 
$113.63 for delivery of the furniture, and established a 
delinquency charge of $5.00 for late payments.  Ortiz generally 
followed the weekly payment plan, although she exercised her 
option to make some biweekly payments in the summer and fall of 
1993.  The rental agreement provided that Ortiz could cancel it 
at any time and return the furniture without further obligation. 
It also stated that if she made 78 weekly payments or 18 monthly 
payments (periods that differ in duration by no more than a 
couple of days), she would own the sofa and love seat.  Thus, the 
agreement is characterized as a rent-to-own (RTO) agreement.   
 After making about 70 weekly payments -- eight payments less 
than the number required to transfer ownership of the property to 
her -- Ortiz ceased making payments, though according to RMI's 
representations at oral argument before us, she retains 
possession of the furniture.  Instead, on April 13, 1994, she 
filed this class action in the Superior Court of New Jersey 
alleging that in offering the RTO agreement, RMI violated the 
TILA by failing to comply with certain of its disclosure 
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requirements.  In support of her claim Ortiz alleged that the 
wholesale price of the furniture was $380.00, far less than the 
total amounts in weekly payments required for her to acquire 
title to the furniture and far less than the amount she had paid 
at the time she filed the lawsuit.1  She characterizes the 
difference in the two amounts as a finance charge and based on 
this characterization contends that the RTO agreement is a credit 
sale within the meaning of the TILA.  In addition to the TILA 
claim, Ortiz asserted causes of action under various New Jersey 
statutes and common law doctrines.   
 RMI removed the case to the district court on April 26, 
1994, and soon thereafter moved to dismiss Ortiz's TILA claim for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  The district court granted 
the motion to dismiss in a memorandum opinion dated January 6, 
1995.  It reasoned that amendments which the Federal Reserve 
Board promulgated in 1981 to Regulation Z, which it had issued 
previously to carry out the purposes of the TILA, placed rent-to-
own contracts such as that Ortiz signed outside the ambit of the 
statute, and that these regulations were entitled to deference. 
Consequently, in the district court's view the TILA simply did 
not govern the RTO agreement.  The court declined to exercise 
jurisdiction over Ortiz's state law claims, and thus it remanded 
the remainder of the complaint to the New Jersey Superior Court. 
                     
1The RTO agreement was annexed to the complaint but the $380.00 
figure is not mentioned in the complaint.  It appears, however, 
that RMI does not dispute that figure and thus we will accept it 
on this appeal. 
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Judgment was entered in the district court on January 11, 1995, 
and Ortiz filed a timely notice of appeal.  The district court 
had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a district court's grant of a motion 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss a complaint. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 The TILA imposes disclosure requirements on persons in the 
business of extending credit to consumers.  In particular, the 
TILA delineates specific requirements for credit transactions, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1631, 1632, as well as detailed instructions 
on how charges and interest rates must be calculated, 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1605, 1606.  The TILA only applies to "credit sales," however, 
and therefore this case turns on the statutory and regulatory 
definition of that term. 
 Congress defined that term under the TILA as follows: 
The term 'credit sale' refers to any sale in which the 
seller is a creditor.  The term includes any contract 
in the form of a bailment or lease if the bailee or 
lessee contracts to pay as compensation for use a sum 
substantially equivalent to or in excess of the 
aggregate value of the property and services involved 
and it is agreed that the bailee or lessee will become, 
or for no other or a nominal consideration has the 
option to become, the owner of the property upon full 
compliance with his obligations under the contract. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1602(g). 
 As the district court recognized, courts interpreting this 
statutory language following the enactment of the TILA split on 
whether contracts like the one at issue here were covered by the 
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act.  See op. at 5 (citing cases).  However, the Federal Reserve 
Board, the agency entrusted by Congress to promulgate 
interpretive regulations enforcing the TILA, consistently opined 
in a series of nonbinding advisory letters issued between 1973 
and 1977 that rent-to-own contracts are beyond the purview of the 
act.  See Remco Enters., Inc. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567, 570-71 
(Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (citing "[u]nofficial staff opinions").  Its 
informal opinions were quite significant, see James P. Nehf, 
Effective Regulation of Rent-to-own Contracts, 52 Ohio St. L.J. 
751, 758, 764 (1991) (hereinafter, Nehf, Rent-to-own Contracts), 
because rent-to-own contracts were common when Congress enacted 
the TILA in 1968, and because the Board's interpretive Regulation 
Z essentially tracked the statutory language.   
 In 1981, the Board formalized its informal opinion and 
amended Regulation Z in one important way.  The regulation reads 
Credit sale means a sale in which the seller is a 
creditor.  The term includes a bailment or lease 
(unless terminable without penalty at any time by the 
consumer) under which the consumer: 
 
 (i) Agrees to pay as compensation for use a sum 
substantially equivalent to, or in excess of, the total 
value of the property and services involved; and 
 
 (ii) Will become (or has the option to become), for no 
additional consideration or for nominal consideration, the 
owner of the property upon compliance with the agreement. 
 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(16).  The language added by 
the amendment is "(unless terminable without penalty at any time 
by the consumer)."  The amended regulation became effective in 
April 1982.   
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 In the first instance, Ortiz urges us to disregard the 
Board's interpretation, as codified in amended Regulation Z. This 
we will not do.  Congress explicitly empowered the Federal 
Reserve Board to promulgate regulations to flesh out the details 
of the TILA: 
The [Federal Reserve] Board shall prescribe regulations 
to carry out the purposes of this subchapter. . . . 
[T]hese regulations may contain such classifications, 
differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide 
for such adjustments and exceptions for any class of 
transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are 
necessary or proper to effectuate the purposes of this 
subchapter, to prevent circumvention thereof, or to 
facilitate compliance therewith. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1604(a).2 
 In the presence of such an explicit delegation of 
congressional authority, we must defer quite broadly to the 
Board's interstitial regulations.  Specifically, in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984), the Supreme Court directed courts to 
exercise the highest level of deference to regulatory 
authorizations such as section 1604(a).  Id. at 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2782.  As we have explained, "when Congress expressly 
delegates authority to an administrative body to fill in the gaps 
of a given statute, the regulations 'are given controlling weight 
unless they arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute,'" Sacred Heart Medical Center v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 537, 
                     
2Congress amended this section in 1994 to exclude certain 
mortgage transactions from the Board's regulatory powers; the 
amendment is not relevant to this case. 
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544 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844, 104 S.Ct. at 
2782).   
 In both of its major TILA cases, the Supreme Court has 
emphasized the broad powers that Congress delegated to the Board 
to fill gaps in the statute.  When it upheld the Board's power to 
extend the TILA's coverage to any seller that accepted payments 
in four or more installments, the Court reviewed the legislative 
history of the TILA and stated: 
The hearings held by Congress reflect the difficulty of 
the task it sought to accomplish.  Whatever legislation 
was passed had to deal not only with the myriad forms 
in which credit transactions then occurred, but also 
with those which would be devised in the future.  To 
accomplish its desired objective, Congress determined 
to lay the structure of the Act broadly and to entrust 
its construction to an agency with the necessary 
experience and resources to monitor its operation. 
Section 105 [15 U.S.C. § 1604] delegated to the Federal 
Reserve Board broad authority to promulgate regulations 
necessary to render the Act effective. 
 
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc. 411 U.S. 356, 365, 93 
S.Ct. 1652, 1658 (1973).  In rejecting the seller's argument that 
the Board had exceeded its regulatory powers, the Court found 
that "the language of the [regulatory] enabling provision 
precludes us from accepting so narrow an interpretation of the 
Board's power."  Id. at 371, 93 S.Ct. 1661. 
 In a subsequent decision addressing disclosure requirements 
governing acceleration clauses in debt contracts, the Court again 
placed great emphasis on Congress' broad grant of regulatory 
powers:  "Because of their complexity and variety, . . . credit 
transactions defy exhaustive regulation by a single statute. 
Congress therefore delegated expansive authority to the Federal 
9 
Reserve Board to elaborate and expand the legal framework 
governing commerce in credit."  Ford Motor Credit Co. v. 
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 559-60, 100 S.Ct. 790, 794 (1980) 
(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1604 and Mourning).  The Court declared that 
"deference is especially appropriate in the process of 
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z" and held 
that "[u]nless demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board 
staff opinions construing the Act or Regulation should be 
dispositive."  Id. at 565, 100 S.Ct. at 797.    
 Ortiz thus faces an extremely high burden -- she must 
convince us that the Board's regulation is demonstrably 
irrational.  Ortiz has failed to overcome this burden.  In the 
first place, the landscape that existed when the Board amended 
Regulation Z was far from clear.  Indeed, the statutory language 
does not lend itself easily to a single unchallengeable 
interpretation.  For example, although the statute refers to 
"credit sales," it provides that certain leases are covered.  And 
although it covers leases that are "contracts to pay as 
compensation for use a sum substantially equivalent to or in 
excess of the . . . value of the property," it is unclear whether 
the language refers to the lessee's rights or obligations.  After 
all, a lessee may have a right to exercise an option to become an 
owner of the property, but may be obliged only to make rental 
payments for the time periods he or she actually uses the 
property.  It is clear, then, that there was a gap in the 
statute.   
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 Thus, it is hardly surprising that courts interpreting the 
TILA prior to the 1981 amendment of Regulation Z reached 
conflicting conclusions with respect to RTO agreements.  In 
Waldron v. Best T.V. and Stereo Rentals, Inc., 485 F. Supp. 718 
(D. Md. 1979), the court declined to say that a lease contract 
terminable at will fell definitively outside the TILA's purview. 
Rather, "[d]espite the presence of the termination clauses, the 
agreement was essentially a contract for the credit sale of the 
TV set to plaintiff for a sum substantially greater than the cash 
sale value of the set."  Id. at 719.  In reaching its decision, 
the court relied heavily on the fact that "the contract was to 
remain in force unless . . . the plaintiff exercised her right to 
terminate the contract and forfeit the equities she had built up 
in the set by her weekly payments . . . ."  Id.  In Smith v. ABC 
Rental Sys. of New Orleans, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. La. 
1978), aff'd, 618 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1980), however, the court, 
interpreting a nearly identical contract, reached precisely the 
opposite conclusion:  Because the agreement was terminable at any 
time, "plaintiff was never obligated for any sum other than the 
$16.00 weekly rental for each week he chose to keep the set." Id. 
at 129.  Therefore, "[t]he week-to-week rental is not a sum 
substantially equivalent to the set's value, and the transaction 
in question is . . . not a credit sale."  Id. 
 It was against this backdrop that the Board amended 
Regulation Z to provide that rental agreements "terminable 
without penalty at any time by the consumer" are not covered by 
11 
the TILA.  As Nehf has explained the situation before and after 
the amendment: 
[a]mid all th[is] uncertainty, it was undeniably true 
that the unpredictability of the situation was 
inadequate for all concerned.  Thus, the Board . . . 
revised Regulation Z . . . to settle the issue.  The 
revised (and current) definition of 'credit sale' . . . 
should have resolved the debate in favor of the RTO 
industry because the heart of an RTO contract is its 
provision for the consumer to return the property at 
any time without further payment.  Several courts have 
since held that the regulation does indeed end the 
discussion. 
 
Nehf, Rent-to-Own Contracts, 52 Ohio St. L. J. at 766.  While 
Ortiz argues that the Board's interpretation is presumptively 
unreasonable because it does not have the effect of protecting 
consumers, we find no authority for the proposition that the 
Board must decide every conceivable question, even detailed and 
technical ones, in favor of expanding the scope of the TILA. 
Rather, the Board has broad discretion to draw the lines 
necessary to effectuate the act.  We therefore cannot say that 
the Board's adoption of one of two plausible interpretations of 
the gap in the statute is demonstrably irrational. 
 Ortiz relies on Clark v. Rent-It Corp., 685 F.2d 245 (8th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225, 103 S.Ct. 1232 (1983), 
but that case does not help her.  Although it adopted a reading 
of the statute consistent with her contentions, the contract 
addressed in that case arose prior to the effective date of the 
1981 amendment of Regulation Z.  Thus, the court did not discuss 
either the amended regulation or the deference due the Board.  As 
such, Clark is simply one of a number of pre-amendment Regulation 
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Z cases that reached varying results without the benefit of the 
Board's formal view. 
 In view of our conclusion that we should defer to the 
regulation, we next determine whether the contract at issue is 
"terminable without penalty at any time by the consumer." 
In this regard, the facts as Ortiz presents them show that if she 
wanted to terminate the lease, she only had to return the 
furniture.  At that point she would not forfeit a deposit to 
which she had title or claim, be obliged to pay any additional 
charges, or be subject to legal action for a recovery of the 
remaining rental payments.  Accordingly, she could terminate the 
lease without penalty. 
 Ortiz seeks to avoid this conclusion by contending that with 
each payment on the lease she developed an equity in the 
furniture which she would lose on its return which loss she 
characterizes as a penalty.3  She finds support for this 
proposition in an unpublished opinion of the New Jersey Superior 
Court, Green v. Continental Rentals, No. L 3182-90 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. Mar. 25, 1994).    
 To adopt Ortiz' argument would be to allow the exception to 
swallow the rule.  If payments made pursuant to a rent-to-own 
contract are considered "forfeited equity" should the lessee 
                     
3Actually, she contends that the penalties include "a forfeiture 
of money paid, a forfeiture of equity accrued in the goods, a 
forfeiture of the goods, and forfeiture of [her] option to 
purchase the goods."  Brief at 20.  The first three so-called 
penalties are the same thing and we do not regard the last as a 
penalty any more than surrendering possession of the furniture is 
a penalty. 
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return the furniture, virtually every rent-to-own contract would 
fall within the purview of the statute.  That, in turn, would 
render the distinctions drawn by the Board's Regulation Z 
essentially meaningless.  As Nehf points out, after examining the 
history behind Regulation Z in detail: 
If a broader notion of penalty were accepted, the only 
lease-purchase agreements that would not be deemed 
credit sales would be those in which equity is never 
created, i.e., leases in which the remaining price to 
be paid for obtaining ownership is at all times equal 
to or greater than the fair market value of the goods. 
As a practical matter, such an interpretation would 
require that, to be exempt from TILA, a terminable 
lease could not transfer ownership unless the dealer 
charged a final payment approximating the product's 
then-fair market value.  This view is difficult to 
justify under the statute because it would render part 
of the definition of credit sale superfluous.  Both the 
statute and Regulation Z provide that a lease is a 
credit sale only if the lessee becomes the owner of the 
leased goods for nominal consideration at the end of 
the agreement.  An option purchase price approximating 
fair market value is generally considered to be more 
than nominal, and all leases, even long-term obligation 
leases, containing such options are generally held not 
to be credit sales.  Thus, an RTO contract with a fair 
market value purchase option would be exempt from TILA 
in any event, irrespective of its terminability, and 
TILA's 'contracts to pay' clause, as well as the 
Board's 'penalty' language in revised Regulation Z, 
would add little, if anything, to the definition. 
Nehf, Rent-to-Own-Contracts, 52 Ohio St. L.J. at 768 (footnotes 
omitted).   
 Additionally, as one court has explained, "[a]lthough the 
renters may have an economic incentive to make the number of 
rental payments necessary to acquire ownership of the goods, the 
agreements provide them the right to terminate at any time."  In 
re Hanley, 135 B.R. 311, 313 n.1 (C.D. Ill. 1990).  Thus, "[t]he 
contractual right to terminate precludes a finding that rent-to-
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own agreements are truly sales with a forfeiture of the property 
upon termination of payments."  Id.   We find the Hanley court's 
analysis persuasive.  Regulation Z can have meaning only if the 
term "penalty" is construed to refer to additional charges 
imposed upon termination of the agreement.  In this case there 
are no additional charges.  Therefore, in spite of our sympathy 
for Ortiz's predicament, we hold that the equity Ortiz 
"forfeited" by failing to continue making rental payments is not 
a penalty for TILA purposes.4 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the judgment 
entered January 11, 1995. 
           
 
 
 
 
                     
4Ortiz also argues that her contract is not terminable at any 
time as it could be terminated only "at the end of a rental 
cycle."  Brief at 8.  The contract, however, does provide that 
the lessee may at her option "at any time terminate this 
agreement, without further obligation or penalty," by returning 
the property and making all payments due under the lease to that 
point.  Of course, inasmuch as rent is payable in advance, 
ordinarily a lessee desiring to terminate a lease would be wise 
to do so at the end of a rental cycle.  Nevertheless, the lease 
is terminable at any time and the possibility that a lessee will 
not retain the use of the property for a period for which she had 
paid rent is no more a penalty than her surrender of her "equity" 
in the furniture. 
